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ABSTRACT  The purpose of this article is to question whether the powers of the 
United Nations Security Council (SC) are subject to any limitation under in-
ternational law, especially in the context of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
doctrine. And consequently, which organism will be entitled to hold the SC 
accountable for its actions, and how that organism should do it.
The first chapter of this article deals with the possible limitations of the SC, 
it considers both legal and legitimacy restraints to the broad powers of the SC. 
Additionally, we will explain how RtoP presents itself as a new challenge to the 
legitimacy of the SC.
Chapter 2 discusses which organisms within the UN system, may be ap-
propriate to hold the SC responsible for its actions. Finally, in Chapter 3, we 
will review the legal status of RtoP, and explain how the ICJ could use Just War 
criteria as a valuable tool for a judicial review process of SC decisions based 
on RtoP.
__________________________
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RESUMEN El propósito de este artículo, es cuestionarse acerca de si los poderes 
del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, se encuentran sujetos a alguna 
limitación prevista por el Derecho Internacional, en especial en el contexto de 
la doctrina de la Responsabilidad de Proteger (RtoP)3. Y, en consecuencia, que 
organismo se encontraría capacitado para obligar al Consejo de Seguridad a 
rendir cuentas y de qué manera podría hacerlo. 
El primer capítulo de este articulo trata acerca de las posibles limitaciones 
del Consejo de Seguridad. En esta sección se consideran restricciones de tipo 
legal y de legitimación a los amplios poderes del Consejo de Seguridad. De 
igual manera, se explicará como la noción de la RtoP, se presenta a sí misma 
como un nuevo desaf ío para la legitimidad del Consejo de Seguridad.
En el segundo capítulo, se discutirá acerca de que organismos, dentro del 
sistema de Naciones Unidas, serían los más adecuados para determinar res-
ponsabilidades del Consejo de Seguridad por sus acciones. Finalmente, en el 
capítulo tercero de este artículo, analizaremos la validez legal de la RtoP y ex-
plicaremos, como la Corte Internacional de Justicia podría utilizar los criterios 
de la doctrina de la Guerra Justa, como una importante herramienta para pro-
cesos de revisión judicial de las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad enmarca-
das en la RtoP.
PALABRAS CLAVE Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; Corte Inter-
nacional de Justicia; Derecho a proteger; Intervención humanitarian; Just War 
Theory.
Introduction
The SC is ‘a structure devoted to maintaining order4.’ This idea is envisaged in the Se-
curity Council’s fundamental task, ‘the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity5.’ For that purpose, this organism is allowed to establish the existence of threats to 
the order and stability of the international community, and make recommendations 
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__________________________
3. We use RtoP as an acronym of Resposabilidad de Proteger in the spanish abstract, in order to 
avoid confusing the reader with other terms.
4. KOSKENNIEMI (1995) p. 335.
5. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter/Charter) art 2.
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or take any measure it deems necessary6, including the use force7, to preserve or re-
instate international peace and security.
In that sense, The SC managed to hold a State legally responsible under interna-
tional law8. Moreover, the SC managed to create two international tribunals9, a matter 
believed to be outside its powers10. Yet possible due to the expansive interpretation 
capacities the UN Charter grants to the SC, in matters of international peace and 
security11. 
Additionally, the SC was able to legislate for every member of the international 
community in matters of international terrorism12, and the risk of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction13. Although that possibility was questioned on several 
occasions due to the danger, it may entail towards the structural balance of the UN 
and the risk of eroding state consent14. The SC may be authorized to act as legislator 
based on an exercise of its implicit powers15, and the binding capacities of its resolu-
tions16.
Accordingly, the SC is a compelling actor in the international system of States. A 
notion that is nowadays reinforced by its capacity to declare, a humanitarian crisis17 
or the necessity to restore a democratically elected government into power18, as brea-
ches of international peace and security. And because of Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP), a doctrine that allows military operations under the authority of the SC, for 
humanitarian purposes, within the sovereign territory of a State19.
__________________________
6. ibid art. 39.
7. ibid art. 42.
8. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) UN Doc S/RES/ 68.
9. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/ 
827 and UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 955 (8 November 1994) UN 
Doc S/RES/ 955
10. Tadic Case (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) ICTY- 
94- 1 (2 October 1995) para 27.
11. ibid paras 31- 36.
12. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) UN Doc S/RES/ 1373.
13. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/
RES/ 1540.
14. See, ROSAND (2005) P. 544
15. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion)) [1949] 
ICJ. Rep 174 p.182- 183.
16. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) art 25. See also, Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 para 117.
17. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688 (1991) UN Doc S/RES/ 688 
art. 2.
18. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 841 (1993) UN Doc S/RES/ 841
19. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 
para. 13.
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As such prominent actor, within the international community, it is important to 
discuss its limitations, especially as we understand the international community of 
nations as a democratic system under the legal framework of international law and 
the UN system. 
1. Drawing boundaries to the Security Council
1.1 Legal limitations
As understood by the ICJ, SC resolutions are accorded prima facie validity20. Conse-
quently, the SC enjoys a considerable liberty to decide which situation may be cha-
racterized as a breach of international peace and security, and in that sense, estimate 
the proper response to that situation. Additionally, SC resolutions are recognized to 
enjoy overriding capacities, by both the UN Charter21 and the ICJ22. As such SC reso-
lutions enjoy primacy over norms of international law contained in treaties or custo-
mary international law.
Nevertheless, the SC is not an almighty organism capable of disavowing every rule 
of international law. In the first place, the SC is part of the UN, an international orga-
nization. The powers and functions of international organizations are determined by 
their instrument of creation, it could be a treaty or in generic terms an international 
agreement under international law23. 
Therefore, the SC is ‘a creature of limited powers and every action of the organi-
zation, or of its organs, must be capable of justification by reference to those powers24.’ 
Accordingly, the Charter grants significant autonomy to the SC, but only as it con-
ducts itself within its framework25. Article 25, for instance, gives binding powers to 
SC Resolutions inasmuch they are created and exercised following the Charter26. This 
allows us to believe that, when SC decisions are indeed ultra vires, there seems to be 
no legal obligation to comply with them27.
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20. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) (Provisional 
Measures) [1992] ICJ Rep 114 para 42 (Lockerbie Case).
21. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) art 103.
22. LOCKERBIE CASE paras 39- 42.
23. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (2011) art. 2.
24. LAUTERPACHT, (1999) p. 93.
25. TADIC CASE para 28.
26. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) art. 25.
27. BOYLE and CHINKIN (2007) p. 230.
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Moreover, Article 24 compels the SC to act in harmony with the purposes and 
principles of the UN28. Consequently, the SC should be able to enact resolutions yet, 
only as described in, inter alia, article 1 (1) of the UN Charter. That is, following ‘the 
principles of justice and international law29.’ Furthermore, article 1(3) commands the 
SC to respect ‘human rights and […] fundamental freedoms30’. In that sense, the SC 
should be bound to respect norms of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
IHRL and IHL norms are not clearly expressed in the Charter, instead they are de-
veloped through treaties and conventions31. Therefore, it would be logical to assume 
them as subordinate to the hierarchical supremacy of SC resolutions32. Nonetheless, 
several norms of IHRL and IHL are also endowed with the status of jus cogens.
As acknowledged by the ILC the prohibitions against ‘genocide, slavery, racial dis-
crimination, crimes against humanity and torture’33,  and the ‘basic rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict34,’ are to be regarded as peremp-
tory norms that would create binding obligations upon the SC.
This position was criticized by Martenczuk, who believes that the SC is not limi-
ted by peremptory norms, as ‘it is essentially a concept from the law of international 
treaties that cannot easily be transplanted into the law of the United Nations35’. By that 
account, jus cogens would also be bound to the superseding capacities granted to UN 
provisions by article 103 of the UN Charter.
__________________________
28. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS art. 24.
29. ibid art 1(1).
30. ibid art 1(3).
31. See for instance, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA 
Res 217 A (III) (UDHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 
993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR);Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Fourth Geneva  Convention)  (adopted  2  August  1949,  entered  into  force  21  October 
1950)  75  UNTS  287;; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 12 
December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.
32. Some authors believe that the SC is bound to respect IHRL and IHL despite their characteri-
zation as jus cogens, for an insight on their opinions see GARDAM (1996) pp. 312- 320.  See also, 
REINISCH (2001) pp. 854- 859.
33. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (2001) art. 26 para 5.
34. ibid art 40 para 5.
35. MARTENCZUK (1999) p. 546.
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However, even if peremptory norms can be limited, this should only be available 
to the ‘legal subject whose protection is the purpose of the rule, but not the legal sub-
ject which aims to widen its powers36.’ Moreover, some peremptory norms ‘cannot be 
waived because even the legal subjects, protected by them, have no right to dispose of 
them. Such rules are meant to protect not only the individual but also the interests of 
all States and human beings37’. Consequently the SC is unable to disavow peremptory 
norms because, as understood by Judge Lauterpacht:
‘The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both customary interna-
tional law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security 
Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obliga-
tion cannot as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms extend to a conflict between a 
Security Council resolution and jus cogens38.’  
1.2. The legitimacy of the Security Council as a limit to its powers
Another aspect that contributes to limit the powers of the SC, is the perceived le-
gitimacy of its actions by the international community. However, to talk about the 
importance of legitimacy, we must first understand that the relationship between in-
ternational law and the international community of States, is far more intricate today 
than it used to be when the UN Charter was adopted. The rise of new actors such as 
mass media, NGO’s and the development of new technologies, are currently challen-
ging the traditional methods on which international law is created, as well as the role 
of international institutions like the SC39. 
As inter-state relations have become a multifaceted process of decision making, 
that relies on several factors, State consent and the rule of law are infused with the 
intricacies of a globalized world. Consequently, legitimacy has acquired a prepon-
derant position, as a tool for supporting our current international legal order and 
institutions. In terms of Boyle and Chinkin:
‘legitimacy is used to enhance the moral persuasiveness of international law by 
importing other values such as those of justice or equity, and conversely, the centrality 
of international law is undermined by assertions of its illegitimacy, either of the system 
as a whole or, more frequently, of particular rules40’. 
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36. DOEHRING (1997) p. 102.
37. ibid p. 103.
38. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos-
nia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Order of 13 September 1993, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Ad Hoc Lauterpacht) [1993] ICJ Rep 325 para 100.
39. REISMAN (2000) pp. 99- 106.
40. BOYLE and CHINKIN (2007) p. 25.
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Moreover, legitimacy ‘is a subjective quality, relational between actor and insti-
tution, and defined by the actor's perception of the institution. The actor's perception 
may come from the substance of the rule or from the procedure or source by which it 
was constituted41.’ In that sense, obedience to SC resolutions, and its capacity to enact 
them are also measured in terms of their legitimacy.
1.3. Responsibility to Protect and the legitimacy of the Security Council
Doubts about the legitimacy of the SC, rely on two broad conceptions, ‘(1) that the 
Council is dominated by a few states, and (2) that the veto held by the permanent 
members is unfair42.’ For this work, our attention will be focused on the perceptions 
of a hegemonic dominance of the SC by powerful States. In that sense, the emerging 
concept of RtoP, would help us to understand and explain this critique against the SC 
legitimacy.
RtoP was developed after the 1999 events in Kosovo, where NATO decided to act 
through force without the consent of the SC, against the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via (FRY)43. NATO based its actions on the idea that a unilateral use of force ‘can be 
justified as an exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by the UN Secre-
tary, but without the Council's express authorisation, where that is the only means to 
avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe44.’ 
Nevertheless, the legitimacy behind NATO’s humanitarian desires may be ques-
tioned. For instance, Chomsky has highlighted the double standard used by powerful 
States to back up military interventions, especially those that seem to rely on huma-
nitarian aims45. As portrayed by Roberts:
‘Humanitarian intervention seems for the most part to be confined to cases in which 
there has been extensive television coverage, where there is some particular interest in 
intervention, and in which there is not likely to be dissent among powers or massive 
military opposition46’. 
__________________________
41. HURD (1999) p. 381.
42. CARON (1993) p. 562.
43. SIMMA (1999) p. 7. For examples of SC Resolutions enacted against the FRY see, UNITED NA-
TIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199 (1998) UN Doc S/RES/ 1199 arts 1- 4; UNIT-
ED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1160 (1998) UN Doc S/RES/1160 art. 8.
44. House of Commons (2000) Vol.1 para 134 available at the UK Parliament Website<https://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2813.htm#a38 > accessed 16 August 
2017.
45. CHOMSKY (2008) pp. 35- 37.
46. ROBERTS (1993) p. 12.
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However, this doesn’t mean that the SC is only dominated by the US or its allies. 
On the contrary, our argument is based on an idea of collective hegemony dominance 
of the SC by its more powerful actors. For instance, NATO States are not the only he-
gemons within the SC, Russia violations of human rights during its armed activities in 
Chechenia have been criticized by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR)47, and have even been judicially challenged by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECHR)48. Yet no indication of a humanitarian intervention was advanced 
in the SC or by any regional organization like NATO.
Nevertheless, despite NATO’s disregard for the authority of the SC, and the 
Charter’s prohibition against a unilateral use of force, both the SC and the UNGA 
seemed to endorse NATO’s actions. In first place by authorizing member ‘States and 
relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in 
Kosovo49’;  while on second hand establishing their costs as UN expenses50.  
This ex-post approval of NATO’s illegal actions, weighed heavily on the legitimacy of 
the SC, as an impartial forum to deal with matters of international peace and security. 
For instance, for a substantial number of international legal scholars51, NATO’s inter-
vention was regarded as a clear violation of article 2(4), due to the legal uncertainty of 
a right to humanitarian intervention52. 
Moreover, NATO’s actions appear to be in flagrant contradiction of UNGA Re-
solution 2131 (XX) of 1965, that sustained the idea that, ‘No State has the right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State53.’ This principle of no-intervention, was further developed 
by the UNGA in Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 197054, where it was recognized as a norm 
of international customary law55. Additionally, NATO’s intervention contradicts ICJ 
jurisprudence on the Nicaragua Case, where it found out that:
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47. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) UN Doc A/56/36 
pp. 4- 7 paras 26–38.
48. Chitayev and Chitayev v. Russia (Judgement) [2007] ECtHR App No. 59334/00 paras 148- 160.
49. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) UN Doc S/RES/ 1244 
art 7. 
50. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 54/245 (2000) UN Doc A/
RES/54/245 Preamble.
51. BROWNLIE and APPERLEY (2000) 49(4) pp. 886- 891.
52. ibid pp. 891- 894.
53. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2131 (1965) UN Doc A/
RES/20/2131 art. 1.
54. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2625 (1970) UN Doc A/
RES/25/2625 art 1.
55. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Judgement on the Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 392 para 188.
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‘In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation 
as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appro-
priate method to monitor or ensure such respect56.’ 
Another Example, may be found in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Operation Iraqi 
freedom remains a contested issue to this day, not only because US claims about wea-
pons of mass destruction have been recently proved to be based on false or flawed 
intelligence,  but because of a widespread perception of its illegality57. Several States 
represented in the Non-Aligned Movement, believed that the ‘war against Iraq has 
been carried out without the authorization of the Security Council. This war is being 
carried out in violation of the principles of international law and the Charter’58. 
This was also the position of the Council of the League of Arab States59. Addi-
tionally, the illegality of the war in Iraq was also perceived by several international 
lawyers60. Even the UN Secretary General believed that, the coalition actions against 
Iraq, amounted to a breach of international law61. 
Nevertheless, through resolution 1483, the SC seemed to once again acquiesce 
with the illegal behavior of powerful States, by recognizing the occupation of Iraq by 
US and UK forces62. Although , it is important to also notice that, SC resolution 1483 
may be also seen as an attempt to constrain and impose the rule of law over rogue 
actions by the US and its coalition in Iraq, mainly by defining that the occupying 
powers must comply with their ‘responsibilities, and obligations under applicable in-
ternational law’63.
__________________________
56. ibid para 268.
57. UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ( 2008)  p.17- 2 avail-
able at the U.S. Senate webpage <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/110345.pdf > accessed 16 August 2017.
58. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION MEETING 4726 (2003) UN Doc 
S/PV.4726 p. 7.
59. ibid pp. 8- 9.
60. See, KRAMER and MICHALOWSKI (2005) pp. 448- 453.
61. BBC NEWS, (2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm> accessed 20 
June 2017.
62. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1483 (2003) UN Doc S/RES/ 1483 
p. 1 preamble.
63. ibid.
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For authors like Alvarez, it is an example of ‘deliberate ambiguity’64,  that fails to 
show how the US and its allies would be held accountable for their responsibilities 
under international law, and ‘leaves the UN role in post-war Iraq extremely vague and 
uncertain, refusing even to concede to the United Nations those tasks within its esta-
blished expertise, such as verifying and supervising a free and fair election’65.
Both Situations, Kosovo and Iraq, created questions on the SC ability to withstand 
pressure by hegemonic powers. In that context, RtoP can be understood as a proposal 
to restore international legitimacy to the SC, and to legally deny the possibility of 
unilateral humanitarian interventions66, ‘[i]n a bid to reconcile intervention and sove-
reignty, and sovereignty and obligation67’. 
According to this notion, each State is responsible for the protection of its citizens 
‘from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’68. However, 
when a State fails to comply with its obligations in accordance to RtoP, the internatio-
nal community may intervene, yet only through a ‘collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, inclu-
ding Chapter VII, on a case- by- case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate’69.
The most recent example of RtoP is perhaps the 2011 SC authorized intervention 
in Libya. On the contrary, to what happened in Kosovo, this time NATO actions see-
med to be both legal and legitimate. Human rights NGO’s, such as Amnesty Inter-
national70 and international institutions like the UN Human Rights Council71, gave 
an account of the excessive force used by the Gadhafi regime against protestors and 
violations of IHRL and IHL.
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64. ALVAREZ (2003) p. 883.
65. ibid.
66. LUCK (2009) p.2. Available at the UN webpage <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/ad-
viser/pdf/EL%20GA%20remarks%202009.pdf > accessed 16 August 2017.
67. ROSSI (2014) p. 357.
68. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 
para 138.
69. ibid para 139.
70. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2011) p.35- 54.  Available at Amnesty International web-
page <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/025/2011/en/ > accessed 16 August 2017.
71. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) UN Doc A/
HRC/17/44 p. 3- 8.
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Moreover, NATO was acting under express permission of the SC, through resolu-
tion 1973 (2011)72. As such, SC resolution 1973 could be an example of the legitimation 
of RtoP under the SC and the UN Charter73. However, though the acknowledgment 
of the SC authority and the primacy of its consent, as the only legal guarantee to 
conduct a military operation for humanitarian purposes, is an achievement in itself. 
Questions upon the institutional legitimacy of the SC are far from being resolved.
For instance, in Libya, NATO began to attack retreating forces loyal to Colonel 
Gadhafi, and military objectives in government-controlled areas, where they didn’t 
present a threat to civilian populations74. They also began to aid rebel forces with 
weapons, military instructors, intelligence operators and even, by deploying armed 
forces in Libyan territory75. 
In that sense, NATO’s objectives appear to overpass those of SC resolution 1973, 
which authorized military actions, yet only ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack76.’ Moreover, the distribution of weapons, and techni-
cal support of anti- Gadhafi movements, looks like a clear violation of SC resolution 
1970 (2011). Which imposed an arms embargo, that also included a prohibition on all 
members of the UN to give aid, in the form of military assistance or training, to both 
parties in the Libyan conflict77. 
Likewise, NATO bombings seem to violate other norms of international law. As 
portrayed by Human Rights Watch, several air raids by NATO airplanes targeted civi-
lian objectives without any valuable indication about their relation to lawful military 
targets78. This would imply a violation of IHL norms, which state the necessity to 
distinguish civilian and military objectives79, and the prohibition to attack civilian ob-
__________________________
72. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1973 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/ 1973 
p. 3.
73. LANDINGHAM (2012) p. 860.
74. KUPERMAN (2013) p. 116.
75. ibid pp. 113- 116.
76. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1973 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/ 1973 
p. 3.
77. ibid art 9.
78. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2012) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/13/unacknowledged- 
deaths/civilian- casualties- natos- air- campaign- libya#290612> accessed 16 August 2017.
79. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 2 December 1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3 art 48.
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jects80. Additionally, the fact that various NATO members had a considerable amount 
of economic interest in Libya81, also cast some doubts about the disinterested aims 
behind their military operations.
Moreover, several States had objections to the legality of NATO actions in Libya82. 
Nonetheless, once again, the SC appeared to allow a hegemonic political agenda to 
overrule the express limitations of a SC resolution, and more importantly over inter-
national law83.  
So even in times of RtoP, the perception of illegitimacy seems to remain over the 
SC. Furthermore, the SC use of RtoP instead of diminishing its perception of illegiti-
macy, appears to increase it. This perception of illegitimacy is problematic to the SC 
because, if SC decisions seem to be unfairly directed to support hegemonic interests, 
their compelling capabilities would be diminished84, leaving us with a SC that would 
still be able to enforce State compliance yet only on account of its capacity to use 
force85. 
Additionally, it will also weaken the SC capacity to deal effectively with breaches 
of international peace and security, because suspicions of illegitimate motives and 
processes behind a SC resolution, may weigh against the possibilities of its approval, 
and may push States to adopt weaker decisions86.  
Moreover, the notion of an imperial security council, that works according to the 
interests of hegemonic powers, is not resolved by the reappraisal of a SC monopoly 
over the use of force in international relations, in any case, it may be reinforced. As 
expressed by Caron, when speaking of the SC at the end of the cold war:
‘[A]s the international community finally achieved what quite a few of its members 
at least officially had sought- a functioning UN Security Council- many of them began 
to have second thoughts about the legitimacy of that body’s use of its collective autho-
rity’87.
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80. ibid arts 51- 52.
81. ELHARATHI (2016).
82. BOOTH (2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/28/libya- bombing- 
un- resolution- law> accessed 29 June 2017. See also, JACOBS (2011) <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/03/23/world/asia/23beiijing.html> accessed 29 June 2017.
83. UNITED NATIONS (2011) <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2011- 03- 29/
secretary- generals- statement- situation- libya- and- implementation> accessed 16 July 2017.
84. FRANCK, (1988) pp. 741- 751.
85. CARON (1993) p. 560.
86. ibid p. 558.
87. ibid p. 553.
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Consequently, if legitimacy claims against the SC are allowed to be expressed 
without a proper organism to conduct the reactions of the international community, 
and solve them through an ordained and impartial process, we may face a continuous 
process of erosion of our collective system of international security.
Because, even if a low perception of the legitimacy of SC decisions may operate as 
a counterweight to an overly authoritative SC, it may also undermine its effectiveness 
to deal with matters of international peace and security by restricting the same autho-
rity it pursues to contest88.
Conclusively, if the SC is allowed to remain unchecked, its broad powers, in con-
sonance with the perceived dominance that powerful States seem to have over it, may 
very well create a world where the SC could be ‘the Judge, the Jury, and the Lord-High 
Executioner of International law89.’  Or in the opposite take us back to the stage of the 
world after WWI, where States lost all credibility in a system of collective security 
and preferred to settle international disputes by their own means.
2. Judging the Security Council
2.1. Evaluating the Security Council through the United Nations General Assembly
In the previous chapter, we mentioned that the Charter granted the SC primary res-
ponsibility in matters of international peace and security90. However, as understood 
by the ICJ, although the SC is the only organism that, ‘can require enforcement by 
coercive action against an aggressor’91, international peace and security is not its ex-
clusive responsibility92. 
The UNGA, for instance, can ‘recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of 
any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or 
friendly relations among nations93’. Moreover, is entitled to deliberate over any matter 
related to the scope of the Charter or the organisms of the UN94. Additionally, it could 
make recommendations to the SC or member states based on ‘general principles of 
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security’95. 
__________________________
88. bid p. 560- 561.
89. MCWHINNEY (2004) p. 58.
90. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) art 24.
91. Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory 
Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151 p.163.
92. ibid.
93. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) art 14.
94. ibid art 10.
95. ibid art 11 (1).
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Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that the UNGA is the appropriate organism to 
hold the SC accountable. In the first place, the UNGA power to make recommenda-
tions on matters of international peace and security, is constrained to those situations 
that are not currently being discussed by the SC96.  
On second hand, even if a general set of guidelines to assess the legitimacy of SC 
resorts to force, may be understood to be within the UNGA competencies under 
article 10 of the Charter, and in harmony with the ICJ statement, that a UN organism 
could not be assumed to act ultra vires, when its actions are directed to achieve the 
purposes of the UN Charter97, this position would be wrong because it would fail to 
take into account that the Charter grants the SC the capacity to ‘adopt its own rules 
of procedure’98. 
Notwithstanding that, authors like Alvarez, have argued that the UNGA may be 
a useful forum to hold the SC responsible, due to its pre-eminence over budgetary 
measures of the UN99. Indeed, article 17 of the Charter, grants the UNGA control over 
the expenses of the organization, including of course those of SC enforcement opera-
tions100. This has also been reaffirmed through UNGA resolutions101.
Nevertheless, a UNGA resolution that lessens or withdraws funds from a military 
operation endorsed by the SC, seems to lose its coercive capacities because of the SC 
dependence on powerful States to act as enforcers. An exercise that is not expressly 
mentioned in the Charter and that may become a further threat to the SC legitima-
cy102, but that has become a standard practice of the SC on a multitude of occasions 
such as Iraq (1990)103, Haiti (1994)104, the Central African Republic (1997)105, East Ti-
mor (1999)106 and the case of Libya, that allowed us to infer how an implementation of 
RtoP may be strongly linked to particular geopolitical interests of hegemonic powers.
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99. ALVAREZ (1996) p. 10.
100. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) art 17.
101. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 55/235 (2001) UN Doc A/
RES/55/235 art 1 (a).
102. See, QUIGLEY (1996) pp. 276- 277.
103. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678 (1990) UN Doc S/RES/678 
art 2.
104. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 940 (1994) UN Doc S/RES/940art 
4.
105. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1125 (1997) UN Doc S/RES/1125 
arts 1- 2.    
106. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1264 (1999) UN Doc S/RES/1264 
art 3.
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In that sense, those States interested in a regime change or control over a particu-
lar territory or recourses may use their own funds, some of which may be even larger 
than those of the UN. We must only compare the 16.8 million budget of the United 
Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)107,  with those of the estimated US 
($896m)108 and UK (£950m) expenses in Libya109, to see the disparity between them.
Following Alvarez ideas, UNGA ‘powers to create potentially troublesome subsi-
diary organs and its ability to refer issues to other UN organs’110, may also be an impor-
tant element to exert more control over SC initiatives. Furthermore, he contends that 
if a more jurisdictive review of SC acts may be required, ad-hoc arbitration, as well as 
other types of arbitration, may be perceived as impartial and therefore more suitable 
options than UN organisms like the ICJ111. 
However, the capacities of subsidiary organisms to review SC decisions, are linked 
to their ability to request advisory opinions to the ICJ112. As such, it would be up to the 
ICJ and not to the organisms themselves, to resolve any doubts upon SC undertakings 
that may be understood to be illegitimate or illegal. Likewise, to take such questions 
to ad-hoc tribunals outside the UN framework could be regarded as discounting the 
ICJ role within the UN system.
As recognized by the Court, its nature as the principal judicial organism of the 
UN, is that of ‘an organ which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of the law, inde-
pendently of all outside influence or interventions whatsoever, in the exercise of the ju-
dicial function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its Statute. A court functioning 
as a court of law can act in no other way’113.
__________________________
107. UNITED NATIONS (2012) <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsmis/
facts.shtml> accessed 16 August 2017.
108. UKMAN (2011) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint- washington/
post/libya- war- costs- for- us- 896- million- so- far/2011/08/23/gIQA5KplYJ_blog.html?utm_
term=.7b62acbb71c4  >  accessed  16  August 2017.
109. HOPKINS (2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/sep/26/uk- operations- 
libya- costs> accessed 16 August 2017.
110. ALVAREZ (1996) p. 10.
111. ibid p. 12.
112. United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered 
into force 24 October 1945) (ICJ Statute/ Statute) art 66.
113. Namibia Advisory Opinion para 29.
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2.2. Judicial Review and the International Court of Justice
However, could the ICJ be the appropriate organism to held the SC accountable 
for its acts? Nowadays, judicial review of SC decisions remains a controversial is-
sue; although such possibility has been denied by the ICJ, who acknowledged that 
‘the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the deci-
sions taken by […] United Nations organs’,114 it has also been subtly endorsed by other 
courts, like the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, who denied its own capacity to engage 
in a process of judicial review, but also mentioned that:
‘[O]nly the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating an advisory opinion re-
ferred to it by the United Nations, could potentially judicially review the actions of 
an organ of the United Nations […] No other judicial body possesses such a power of 
potential judicial review of the Security Council’115.  
Another example is the ICTY who concluded that, although the ICJ assertion 
about its lack of powers of judicial review was right, it was only referred to ‘a matter 
of "primary" jurisdiction. They do not address at all the hypothesis of examination of 
the legality of the decisions of other organs as a matter of "incidental" jurisdiction, in 
order to ascertain and be able to exercise its "primary" jurisdiction over the matter 
before it’116.
Consequently, the actual practice of the Court, shows that it has accepted the pos-
sibility of judicial review in both its cases and advisory opinions117. For instance, as 
portrayed by the ICTY118, the ICJ proceeded to exercise a limited process of judicial 
review, over SC and UNGA resolutions, in its advisory opinion about Namibia to 
sustain its jurisdiction119.
Another question is that of a possible conflict of hierarchies between the Court 
and the SC. Neither the UN Charter nor the Statute of the ICJ, contain an express 
provision that authorizes the Court to exercise judicial control over other organs of 
the UN, that may resemble those of constitutional courts in national systems120. Mo-
reover, that possibility was denied by the drafters of the Charter121.
ALMEIDA ESTRELLA
BE T WEEN LEGALIT Y AND LEGITIMACY, A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECURIT Y COUNCIL COLLEC-
TIVE SECURIT Y AC TIONS IN LIGHT OF RESPONSIBILIT Y TO PROTEC T AND JUST WAR THEORY
__________________________
114. ibid para 89.
115. Al- Ayyash et al. (Decision on the Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction and Legality of the 
Tribunal) STL- 11- O1/PT/TC (27 July 2012) para 55.
116. Tadic Case para 21.
117. Lockerbie Case pp. 669- 670.
118. Tadic case para 21.
119. Namibia Advisory Opinion para 89.
120. Certain expenses advisory opinion p.168.
121. HIGGINS (1963) p. 66.
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Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be understood as an outright prohibition of judicial 
review. Rather than that, it is clear that in a horizontal system of administration like 
the UN, where no hierarchical divisions exist, ‘each organ must, in the first place at 
least, determine its own jurisdiction’122. And on the contrary to the UNGA, no prohi-
bition impedes the ICJ from addressing at the same time an issue that is already being 
considered within the SC123, as ‘[b]oth organs can therefore perform their separate but 
complementary functions with respect to the same events’124.
The idea of distinctive functions of the SC and the ICJ, allows us to believe that, 
‘there are certain categories of international disputes that by their very nature are not 
appropriate for judicial settlement’125. This creates some doubts about the ICJ capacity 
to deal with political issues. However, The Court has sustained that the existence of 
political questions, which in matters of disputes concerning States or international 
governance organisms like the UN are constantly happening, does not preclude the 
Court from addressing the legal issues that are generated by them126.
Accordingly, the Court would be able to exercise its jurisdiction in situations re-
lated to international peace and security, because the political frame of those matters 
does not automatically disavow the legal setting in which policy decisions of UN or-
gans must be grounded. As mentioned by the Court, ‘[t]he political character of an 
organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the 
Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment’127.
Nonetheless, it’s important to avoid confusing, the complementary functions of 
the ICJ and the SC, in order to prevent an intromission within the spheres of juris-
diction of both organisms. A process of judicial review, doesn’t mean that the ICJ is 
allowed to overpass a SC determination of a threat to international peace and security 
and replace it with its own judgement.
__________________________
122. Certain expenses advisory opinion p. 168.
123. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment) [1984] ICJ Rep 392 para 95.
124. ibid. See also, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America 
v. Iran) (Judgement) [1980] ICJ Rep 3 para 40.
125. MARTENCZUK (1999) p. 649.
126. Tehran Case para 37. See also Nicaragua Case Jurisdiction para 93; MARTENCZUK (1999) p. 
651; and FRANCK (1995) pp. 329- 332.
127. Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4) (Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 
57 p. 64.
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As portrayed by Akande, there is general support behind the idea that a determi-
nation on the existence of a breach of international peace and security, or an act of 
aggression, is a discretionary competence of the SC; and that the legal standards that 
the Court would require to pass such verdict are not clear or recognized128. 
Consequently, the Court is not apt to judge the accuracy of a SC resolution that 
determines the existence of a breach of international peace and security, which is a 
political issue entrusted to the SC as a political organism. What is available to the 
Court is to exercise a restricted process of judicial review, that takes into considera-
tion the legal limitations that the SC must consider, when acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter129. 
Another problem that needs to be solved are the consequences of a judicial review 
process by the Court. The court competence is limited to two situations, a legal dis-
pute between States130, and an advisory opinion request formulated by an authorized 
organism131. Both situations, as we saw before, may give rise to a process of judicial 
review of SC decisions by the Court; however, the authoritative weight of an ICJ jud-
gement in both instances is debatable.
In the event of a dispute between States, ICJ judgements are considered binding, 
yet only ‘between the parties and in respect of that particular case’132. While in the 
circumstance of advisory opinions, an ICJ decision do not necessarily purport bin-
ding capabilities, and may be considered as guidance rather than a mandatory judge-
ment133. As such they could be disregarded by the SC.
Nevertheless, an extreme position that takes those ideas to the letter, would fail 
to contemplate that even if ICJ judgements are binding only on the parties to the 
dispute, they are also considered as part of the sources of international law that the 
Court may use as basis for its legal reasoning and adjudication134. In that sense, they 
may be understood as creating a form of international jurisprudence, that will force 
the Court to judge on similar grounds for further cases in which a judicial review of 
SC decisions may proceed. A practice not uncommon to the ICJ135.
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128. AKANDE (1997) pp. 337- 338.
129. ibid pp. 339- 341.
130. ICJ Statute art 34.
131. ibid art 65.
132. ibid art 59.
133. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15 p.19. See 
also, Certain Expense Advisory Opinion p. 168.
134. ICJ Statute art 38 (d).
135. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (Judgment) [2003] ICJ Rep 
161 para 34. See also, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 para 59.
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Additionally, advisory opinions may also have binding aptitudes, like in the Con-
vention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, that qualifies advi-
sory opinions of the Court as decisive in a dispute between a State member of the 
UN and the organization136. Moreover, advisory opinions may acquire compulsory 
characteristics in the sense that, as with contentious cases before the ICJ both of them 
lay down the law, and therefore might determine the legality of acts performed by a 
UN organ137. As portrayed by Gray, ‘there is little distinction in substance and effects 
between Advisory Opinions and judgments; the major differences are merely procedu-
ral’138.
Consequently, if the Court is able to deduce a violation of the principles and pur-
poses of the UN Charter or jus cogens, by a SC resolution in a contentious case or an 
advisory opinion, then the validity of that resolution could be questioned139. Likewise, 
if the Court is able to show that the SC has overstepped its procedural functions in 
rendering a resolution, and consequently acted ultra vires, then such decision, may 
not be complied as it would lack legal force140. 
As such, even if provocative, judicial review remains as a valid, yet more impor-
tantly, a legitimate possibility to hold the SC legally responsible. Furthermore, as un-
derstood by Franck, ‘any UN organ must be judged by reference to the Charter as a 
"constitution" of delegated powers. In extreme cases, the Court may have to be the last-
resort defender of the system's legitimacy if the United Nations is to continue to enjoy 
the adherence of its members’141.  
Nevertheless, the previous discussion about RtoP, brings us further to a new ques-
tion: would it be possible for the ICJ to conduct a process of judicial review of SC 
decisions based on the principle of RtoP, inasmuch it is considered as an ethical norm 
rather than a legal one?
__________________________
136. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (adopted 13 February 
1946, entered into force 17 September 1946) 327 UNTS 90 art 30.
137. GRAY (1987) p. 100.
138. ibid p. 101.
139. Certain expenses advisory opinion p. 167.
140. LAUTERPACHT (1965) p. 111.
141. FRANCK (1992) p. 523.
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3. A process of Judicial review in Light of RtoP and Just War Theory
3.1. The normative status of RtoP
RtoP appears to be crafted in mandatory terms, the use of the word responsibility 
seems to highlight a positive duty of States to comply with the doctrine142. However, 
RtoP is commonly regarded as an emerging norm, not as an actual rule of internatio-
nal law143. A definition that is not without importance, as it may allow the recognition 
of RtoP as International Customary Law (ICL).
RtoP has been acknowledged on several occasions through UN reports144, and 
UNGA resolutions145; these instruments ‘may be evidence of existing law, or formative 
of the opinio juris or State practice that generates new customary law’146. Although 
several States seem to remain sceptic on the contents and application of RtoP147, a 
unanimous position of the whole of the international community is not a prerequisite 
to constitute a norm of ICL.
As explained by Dupuy, evidence of a customary norm, is conditioned to the par-
ticipation of the most representative States of the field in which the rule would be 
applied148. Regarding RtoP, the participation of representative States should be quali-
fied by those States who, as part of the SC, decide when and how this organism must 
exercise its powers of collective security. 
The fact that the SC, has implemented several collective security operations based 
on RtoP149, gives significant evidence of State practice around this principle. Never-
theless, State practice on its own is not enough to indicate the existence of ICL, as 
understood by the ICJ:
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142. EATON (2011) p. 801.
143. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON 
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 para 203. See also, UNITED 
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (2005) UN Doc 
A/59/2005 para 135.
144. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL 
(2009) UN Doc A/63/677 p. 4; UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY GENERAL (2013) UN Doc A/67/929 pp.1- 2; UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AS-
SEMBLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (2015) UN Doc A/69/981 para 3.
145. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 
paras 138- 140.
146. BOYLE (2014) p. 118.
147. STAHN (2007) p.108. See also, FOCARELLI (2008) pp. 202- 203.
148. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Ad 
Hoc Award) [1977] 53 ILR 389 paras 87- 91.
149. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1706 (2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 
preamble; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1894 (2009) UN Doc S/
RES/1894 preamble.
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‘Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also 
be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of Law requiring it. […] The States concer-
ned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. 
The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough’150. 
As such, RtoP seems to depend on the compulsory capacities of pre-existing 
norms, that have already been recognised by the international community as part 
of international law151. As portrayed by Edward C. Luck, RtoP ‘is a political, not le-
gal, concept based on well- established international law and the provisions of the UN 
Charter’152. 
In that sense, both national States and the international community as a who-
le would comply with RtoP, yet not because they find themselves committed to the 
principle as a legal norm, but because they must already perform in accordance with 
their previous legal commitments under international law, which at the same time are 
contained in the concept of RtoP.
Although, the existence of a conventional norm does not affect its existence as 
customary law153, RtoP seems to be more a reaffirmation of current rules, than a para-
llel standard of customary law154. Moreover, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, men-
tions that the international community is ‘prepared to take collective action [...] on a 
case- by- case basis’155. This appears to indicate that a SC intervention is a discretionary 
measure not a legal obligation156. 
Therefore, a certainty of opinio juris regarding RtoP as a customary obligation 
under international law, remains at least a contested issue for the international com-
munity of States. Consequently, due to the uncertain status of RtoP as a legal concept, 
it would be difficult to claim it has achieved the rank of a norm of ICL. Then, perhaps 
the best view is to look at RtoP as an ethical norm157.
__________________________
150. North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Ger-
many/Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 para 77. See also, Nicaragua Case para 184.
151. Those norms would be, inter alia, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948 entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 6 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.
152. LUCK (2009) Available at the UN webpage <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/
pdf/EL%20GA%20remarks%202009.pdf > accessed 16 August 2017.
153. Nicaragua Case para 174.
154. BELLAMY (2010) p.160.
155. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 
para 139.
156. HEHIR (2010) pp. 231-232.
157. EVANS (2009) p. 4. Available at the UN webpage <http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interac-
tive/protect/evans.pdf > accessed 16 August 2017.
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As proposed by Gözen Ercan, RtoP should be understood as, ‘a standard of appro-
priate behaviour for states to follow in their internal affairs and for the international 
community in its conduct’158. For this author, such understanding is possible because, 
as ‘no original binding mechanism has been established to coerce adherence to the 
norm, the implementation of R2P is mainly dependent on the ethical understanding 
and the political will of states’159. 
3.2. Judicial Review of RtoP and the dangers of Non liquet
Nevertheless, if RtoP is not a legal concept, how would the ICJ be able to determine 
the legal boundaries of that concept? It looks, as if the Court would be compelled to 
base its judgement on moral principles, a possibility that is forbidden by its Statute, 
because the ICJ is bound to adjudicate based on the recognized sources of internatio-
nal law; unless it is authorized to decide a case ex aequo et bono160.   
In such case, the Court may be in front of a circumstance, where State practice 
has ‘thrown the law into a state of confusion where legal rules are not clear and where 
no authoritative answer is possible’161. As understood by Lauterpacht, this type of si-
tuation, where a ‘defective adaptation of existing law to new developments,’162 creates 
a vacuum in the international legal order163, may be understood as a possible case of 
non liquet.
The existence of non liquet in international law, has been denied in absence of any 
evidence of its recognition in the practice of the ICJ164. However, nowadays, we count 
with at least one case, in which the Court appeared to acknowledge its presence165. 
In this case, the Court, paradoxically decided that ‘in view of the current state of in-
ternational law […] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self- defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake.’166
__________________________
158. ERCAN (2014) p. 45.
159. ibid.
160. ICJ Statute art 38.
161. GLENNON (2003) p. 98.
162. LAUTERPACHT (1933) p. 73.
163. ibid pp.73- 74.
164. STONE (1959) p. 138.
165. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
166. ibid para 105.
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This ICJ judgement, has been interpreted as a possible recognition that non liquet 
would be a legal possibility within the Court’s advisory jurisdiction:
‘In advisory proceedings, non liquet is an expression of the principles of self- inter-
pretation and polynormativity that are characteristic of the international legal system. 
Therefore, when in response to a request for an advisory opinion, the I.C.J. concludes 
"that it cannot conclude," such a response appropriately may reflect the state of the law 
and the specific role the Court plays in such matters’167. 
Nonetheless, during the same case, the likelihood of non liquet was denied on 
several dissenting opinions. As portrayed by Judge Schewebel, the ICJ is banned from 
exercising non liquet, this prohibition was expressed by the drafters of the Court’s 
Statute, who introduced the concept of general principles of law as part of article 38 
to specifically avoid this circumstance168; this argument was also shared by Judge Hi-
ggins169, and Judge Koroma170.  
There are two points of view that deal with the problem of non liquet. The first one 
‘arises from the conception of the State as having a sovereignty which cannot be limited 
except where the State voluntarily agrees’171. As such everything that is not forbidden 
by international law, as declared by the will of States, is allowed172. From this perspec-
tive, there is no space for a vacuum of normativity in international law, ‘[t]he 'no- law's 
land' of non liquet would be occupied by permissive legal rules’173. 
However, the idea that no such thing as a gap may exist in international law seems 
to be a bit extreme, for it would give a “get out of jail free card” to States or organi-
zations, in respect to their actions in a space not yet constrained under international 
normativity. Additionally, it would also deny the practice of the ICJ, which as in, inter 
alia, its Barcelona Traction case has already acknowledged the existence of gaps in 
international law174.
__________________________
167. WEIL (1997) p. 119.
168. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of Vice- President Schwe-
bel)[1996] ICJ Rep 226 p. 323.
169. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226 paras 38- 39.
170. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226 p. 558.
171. AZNAR (1999) p. 8.
172. The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Judgement) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 10 p. 18.
173. STONE (1959) p. 136.
174. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (Judgment) [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3 para 89. For more examples of gaps in International law found by the ICJ see, AZNAR 
(1999) pp. 10- 13.
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The second point of view, was the one developed by Judges Schwebel, Higgins and 
Koroma175; which as mentioned earlier, relates to the idea that even if gaps exist in 
international law, it is the responsibility of the Court to fill them by using the sources 
of international law. This seem to be the better view, as it solves the problem of non 
liquet, without relying in a theoretical artifice that denies the existence of gaps in in-
ternational law, but on a practical exercise of the Court ‘s judicial function.
As described by Judge Higgins, ‘[i]t is exactly the judicial function to take princi-
ples of general application, to elaborate their meaning and to apply them to specific 
situations. This is precisely the role of the International Court, whether in contentious 
proceedings or in its advisory function’176. 
Conclusively, the experience of the ICJ allows us to draw some ideas about how 
the Court may conduct a process of judicial review of a SC decision based on RtoP, if 
faced with a possible situation of non liquet. In the first place, the Court would be able 
to base its contentions on existing legal norms that even if not expressly addressed to 
RtoP, are part of the regulatory framework in which RtoP operates.
Additionally, as a collective action under the SC is an exception to the prohibition 
on the use of force, IHL may be an important tool to assess the legality of a SC action 
based on RtoP, as ‘[t]he rules of the humanitarian law of war have clearly acquired the 
status of jus cogens, for they are fundamental rules of a humanitarian character, from 
which no derogation is possible without negating the basic considerations of humanity 
which they are intended to protect’177. 
Finally, the Court would also be allowed to use general principles of internatio-
nal law, and if necessary, compare them with principles contained in national law, in 
conformity with its actions on the Barcelona traction case178. Or to identify that RtoP 
has indeed achieved the status of customary international law179, as in the Nicaragua 
Case. 
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175. For an insight of other authors opinions regarding the second point of view regarding non 
liquet see, LAUTERPACHT (1933) pp. 77- 84.
176. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226 para 32; see also Tomka ( 2013)     p. 5     available     at     the     ICJ     webpage     <http://
www.icj- cij.org/files/press- releases/4/17684.pdf > accessed 16 August 2017.
177. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry) 
[1996]. ICJ Rep 226 p. 496.
178. Barcelona Traction Case para 38.
179. Nicaragua Case paras 184- 190.
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3.3. Avoidance of Non Liquet Revisited
Nevertheless, another method may be available to the ICJ, as an appropriate way to 
deal with a possible situation of non liquet, yet it requires the Court to identify RtoP as 
soft law. Although instruments like for example UNGA resolutions, have no binding 
capabilities and consequently, should not be regarded as law180, they may acquire a 
significant role in the development of international law, especially as an instrument 
‘for authoritative interpretation or amplification of the terms of a treaty’181. 
As understood by Eaton and Focarelli, RtoP may be interpreted as a new unders-
tanding of the concept of sovereignty that is portrayed in the UN Charter182. In terms 
of the UN Secretary General, RtoP is ‘a conceptually distinct approach centered on the 
notion of “sovereignty as responsibility” […] sovereignty entailed enduring obligations 
towards one’s people, as well as certain international privileges’183. 
Therefore, as developed by the UNGA in resolution 60/1 and the reports of the 
Secretary General, RtoP can be understood as a subsequent agreement between the 
parties that interprets the provisions of the Charter184. However, the problem with this 
approach lies in the indeterminacy of RtoP concepts and implementation. As portra-
yed by the Non-Aligned Movement, it is commonly recognized that ‘each individual 
State has the responsibility to protect its populations’185. But, in order ’to legitimize 
unilateral coercive measures or intervention in the internal affairs of States. There are 
also pertinent questions about the role to be played by each of the principal organs 
within their respective institutional mandates and responsibilities in this regard’186.  
This situation seems to continue unresolved, as exposed by the UN Secretary Ge-
neral in 2015, RtoP has acquired a prominent position in UN practice accounting to, 
inter alia, 30 SC resolutions and 13 resolutions of the Human Rights Council based 
on RtoP187. However, when dealing with matters of collective security measures under 
__________________________
180. KLABBERS (1996) p. 171.
181. BOYLE (1999) p. 905. See also, BOYLE (2005) pp. 572- 574.
182. EATON (2011) p. 773- 776; FOCARELLI (2008) pp. 191- 193.
183. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL 
(2009) UN Doc A/63/677 para 7.
184. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 31(3).
185. ABDELAZIZ (2009) p. 1 available at the International Coalition for the Responsibility to pro-
tect webpage <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/NAM_Egypt_ENG.pdf> accessed 16 August 
2017.
186. ibid.
187. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL 
(2015) UN Doc A/69/981 para 5. 
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Chapter VII of the Charter, ‘the record also shows a lack in both the political will and 
cohesion of the international community, which has compromised the pursuit of a con-
sistent and timely response to protecting populations’188.
In that sense, as understood by Stahn, maybe the notion of RtoP ‘is so indetermi-
nate that it does not yet meet the requirements of a legal norm’189. This means that in 
the context of judicial review, the Court would be required to interpret this concept 
before it is able to verify the limits and scope that the Charter and International law 
impose, over a SC resolution that aims to implement a collective enforcement opera-
tion based on RtoP. As such, we argue that the Just War Theory (JWT) may provide 
the Court with a valuable tool to solve the puzzle of RtoP.
3.4. Just War criteria as a tool for legal reasoning and adjudication
JWT has been traditionally used as an instrument for the interpretation of ethical 
and legal constrains that a State needs to consider before engaging in a military ope-
ration190. As war, is now considered as an illegal activity within the international com-
munity of States191, that only knows two exceptions: Self-defence192, and a collective 
security action by the SC193, it is only logical that JWT reasoning may be transplanted 
from the sphere of national decision making, to that of collective decision making by 
the SC. 
Moreover, if our aim is to be able to evaluate the actions of the SC, and conse-
quently hold it accountable for possible breaches of its limitations within the Charter 
and those imposed by jus cogens, JWT may be a valuable criterion to consider by the 
Court.
However, it is also important to notice that JWT has also been criticized for being 
a possible way to disavow the legal framework construed by the UN Charter to deal 
with matters of a use force, and replace it with a moral process of justification194. Our 
contemporary appreciation of war appears to be more concerned with legality than 
morality, as portrayed by Kelsen, war ‘is permitted only as a reaction against an illegal 
act, a delict, and only when directed against the State responsible for this delict’195. 
__________________________
188. ibid para 36.
189. STAHN (2007) p. 102.
19. FOTION (2007) p. 2.
191. UN Charter art. 1(4).
192. ibid art. 51.
193. ibid art. 42.
194. DINSTEIN (2004) p. 880.
195. KELSEN (1990) p. 331.
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Authors like Walzer, also support the idea that war within the UN system of States 
is subject to a legal paradigm196. In that sense, a revival of just war ethics and princi-
ples would not only be a dangerous erosion of the Charter values, but would also be 
unconnected to the legality of a use of force. As portrayed by Dinstein, ‘it is totally 
irrelevant today whether or not a war is just. The sole question is: is war legal, in accor-
dance with the Charter?’197.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that our argument is not aimed to replace the 
existent legal structure of the Charter, it is only addressed, to highlight the usefulness 
of JWT for a legal interpretation of RtoP by the ICJ in a context of judicial review. 
JWT has been widely discussed by several scholars of international law198, conse-
quently, the court may be able to use JWT as a subsidiary tool for its process of legal 
reasoning based on article 38 (1)(d) of its Statute199. As such, the Court would not 
substitute the legal norms that rule over a collective enforcement operation by the SC 
as depicted in the Charter or international law, it would only appreciate them in light 
of RtoP, as new understanding of the Charter’s principles and provisions.
This approach seems possible, because both archetypes, the UN Charter, and 
JWT, share a number of common features that allow a possible interaction of their 
concepts. Collective security operations are the clearer example of JWT principles in 
contemporary international law, for instance, Neff has pointed out that enforcement 
actions through the SC may be understood as a proper action of just war, while self-
defence may be characterized as a quasi-just war200.
Collective security measures resemble the idea of just war as they encompass both 
defensive and offensive actions201. SC resolutions for Iraq202, and Sierra Leone203 give 
an account of the punitive and law enforcement character that collective security 
measures may acquire. This is also a core feature of JWT, that understands war as an 
enforcement operation, justified in order to correct a wrong inflicted by an enemy204.
__________________________
196. WALZER (2015) pp. 58- 63.
197. DINSTEIN (2004) p. 880.
198. See for instance, STONEBRAKER and IRVING (2014) p. 373- 392; BRUNNÉE and TOOPE 
(2004) p.63- 92; WHETHAM (2016) p.55-69; LAUTERPACHT (1946) p. 2- 53; JOHNSON (2006) 
pp. 114- 127.
199. ICJ Statute article 38 (1)(d).
200. NEFF (2005) p. 327.
201. ibid pp. 324- 325.
202. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678 (1990) UN Doc S/RES/678.
203. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1133 (1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132.
204. NEFF (2014) p. 3.
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Furthermore, collective security operates on the premise that any unilateral resort 
to force that is not grounded on self-defence, is an illegal conduct under the eyes of 
international law205, as such it leaves no room for a stance of neutrality towards the 
transgressor206. Rights of neutrality, would only be available, as a duty over ‘[m]embers 
of the United Nations to accept some qualification of their legal position of impartiali-
ty in relation to the State which is not the wrongdoer’207.  
This resembles the separation that JWT in the middle ages imposed over the be-
lligerents in a conflict, where no support was available to the unjust side, in the very 
sense that criminal acts find no support because those who aid a criminal are consi-
dered as accomplices to the wrongful act208. 
The possibility to integrate a JWT analysis into SC enforcement operations based 
on RtoP has been noticed by the international community, for instance, the Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), recognized the 
necessity to adopt a set of criteria for decision making on RtoP implementation. For 
that purpose, the ICISS proposed six criteria of legitimacy, ‘right authority, just cause, 
right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects’209. 
Following that, in 2004 the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change 
(Panel), also proposed a set of criteria that should be addressed when dealing with 
RtoP, not only by the SC, but by ‘anyone else involved in these decisions’210. Those cri-
teria were: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and 
balance of consequences211.
__________________________
205. DISTEFANO (2014) pp. 545- 549.
206. SEGER (2014) p. 251.
207. LAUTERPACHT (1968) p. 65.
208. NEFF (2005) p. 75.
209. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
(2001) para 4.16 available at the International Coalition for the Responsibility to protect webpage 
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf > accessed 16 August 2017.
210. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON 
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 p.61
211. ibid p. 67 para 207.
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The resemblance of the aforementioned sets of criteria with the seven principles 
of JWT: (1) a just cause;( 2) lawful authority; (3) right intention; (4) a reasonable pro-
bability of success; (5) proportionality in the use of force;(6) war as a last resort; and 
(7) the goal of war must be peace212, is remarkable and shows the influence of JWT in 
the international community. Consequently, when engaged in a judicial review of SC 
decisions based on RtoP, the Court, may be able to tackle the vagueness of RtoP by 
delineating its limits and scope in accordance with JWT principles. Some examples 
will allow us to illustrate this proposal.
For instance, following the set of criteria developed by the Panel, “Seriousness of 
threat” could be equated to the idea of just cause, which is understood as a threshold 
that provides legal viability to a claim that intends to match a specific use of force to a 
just war213. In the particular case of RtoP, only four justifications may allow the SC to 
engage in a collective enforcement operation, ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity’214.  Moreover, the possible harm that these situations 
may impose over a State or to human safety, must be ‘sufficiently clear and serious, to 
justify prima facie the use of military force’215. 
If the SC is unable to ground a resolution on any of the parameters mentioned 
above, it would have failed the just cause, or “Seriousness of threat” test, and conse-
quently misused RtoP. Accordingly, this would mean that the SC has acted against the 
principles and purposes of the Charter, as are now interpreted under RtoP, and such 
resolution could be considered both illegal and illegitimate.
This can also be said about “Balance of consequences”, which seems particularly 
related to the JWT principle of proportionality. As understood by Johnson, propor-
tionality means that the ‘overall good achieved by the use of force must be greater than 
the harm done’216. The same premise was followed by the Panel217, and could allow 
the Court to judge the effectivity of a SC resolution based on RtoP, and perhaps re-
commend additional measures, or plainly reject a resolution that would deepen the 
problem rather that resolve it.
__________________________
212. JOHNSON (2014) p. 27.
213. NEFF (2005) pp. 50- 51.
214. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 
para 139.
215. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON 
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 para 207 (a).
216. JOHNSON (2014) p. 28.
217. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON 
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 para 207 (e).
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“Proper purpose” means that the main objective ‘of the proposed military action 
is to halt or avert the threat in question’218. As such it could be equated to the idea of 
right intention, a concept that echoes the Cristian principle of loving your enemy, and 
implies that the purpose of conducting a war is not greed or self-interest, neither it 
is hate, but a righteous action for the sake of the community219. This would allow the 
Court, to identify if a SC resolution goes beyond the required threshold of avoiding a 
humanitarian crisis and became, for example, a military intervention for the purpose 
of regime change. A useful tool if the 2011 events of Libya would repeat themselves 
in another country.
The idea of “Last resort”, as the necessity to assess if no other means than a resort 
to force would be successful in resolving the problem, is present in both JWT crite-
ria220, and those developed by the Panel221. This principle would allow the Court to 
analyze if preventive actions222, as well as aid building capacities223, where previously 
considered to a military intervention and consequently, rebuff a SC decision that has 
failed to take into account those measures.
“Proportional means” and “reasonable hope of success’,224  are also considered in 
both JWT and the Panel criteria. The former is addressed to identify if, ‘the levels and 
means of using force must be appropriate to the just ends sought225’; while the latter, 
implies the necessity to consider the chances of success of a military action226. In such 
case, both principles could be used to measure the amount of compromise by the 
international community, and avoid possible failures.
__________________________
218. ibid 207 (b).
219. NEFF (2005) pp. 51- 53.
220. JOHNSON (1999) p. 28.
221. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON 
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 para 207 (b).
222. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 
para 139.
223. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL 
(2009) UN Doc A/63/677 para 28.
224. JOHNSON (1999) p. 29. See also, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT 
OF THE HIGH- LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc 
A/59/565 para 207 (e).
225. ibid p.28. See also, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- 
LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 para 
207 (d).
226. ibid p. 29. See also UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE HIGH- 
LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE (2004) UN Doc A/59/565 para 
207 (e).  
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If a SC resolution is bound to fail, then the Court would be able to review it and 
prevent a further loss of legitimacy by the SC. At the same time if the success of an en-
forcement action can be measured by the Court, then the SC would take every effort 
to design an appropriate resolution and gather enough support from the international 
community, so the resolution may pass this test and could be implemented.
Additionally, even if not considered by the panel, an example can be drawn from 
the JWT criteria of lawful authority, a principle that is based on the idea that a just 
war is only possible under authorization of a sovereign, or a proper authority. This 
means that war is allowed only when it is waged in defense of community interests, 
and not over particular benefits227. As such, no unilateral use of force based on RtoP 
could be legitimized, not even through an ex post endorsement by the SC. Any reso-
lution crafted with such intent would also fail to pass the right authority check, and 
could be subsequently invalidated in a process of judicial review.
Although any unilateral resort to force is already considered illegal according to 
Article 1(4) of the Charter228, lawful authority, could be a useful way to highlight the 
role of the SC, as the appropriate organism to conduct an enforcement operation 
linked to RtoP, and finally absolve any doubt about the illegality of a unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention. Hopefully allowing the international community to avoid a 
reprisal of the events of Kosovo and Iraq.
The exercise of construing this kind of tests, to aid the Court’s process of legal re-
asoning, is not a strange practice to the ICJ. For example, the Court has been able to 
stablish, that a State’s responsibility to prevent acts of genocide, was an obligation of 
conduct and not one of result229. 
Subsequently, the ICJ ‘set out a flexible test for deciding whether a state has duly 
discharged the obligation to prevent’230 acts of genocide, based on the principle of 
due diligence, that included, inter alia, a measure of the State capacity to effectively 
influence an action that prevents a situation of genocide231. 
Consequently, following its practice, the Court may create a test based on JWT 
criteria that settles an appropriate process to implement and interpret RtoP, and thus 
evaluate SC decisions based on that principle.
__________________________
227. NEFF (2005) p. 50.
228. UN Charter art .1(4).
229. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement) [2007] ICJ Rep 43 para 430.
230. HIGGINS (2010) pp.286- 287.
231. Genocide Case para 430.
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4. Conclusion
In our previous discussion, we found out that the UN Charter and jus cogens are the 
main legal constrains to the SC broad powers in matters of international peace and 
security. Additionally, the perceptions that the international community has about 
the legitimacy of SC actions, weighs over its effectiveness to pass and implement re-
solutions. 
In this context, RtoP as was implemented during the civil conflict that ravaged 
Libya in 2011, seems to remain as an additional challenge to the legitimacy of the SC. 
Specially, as it appears to be connected to the idea of a hegemonic dominance of the 
SC by powerful States, that use this concept, as a justification to intervene within the 
domestic sphere of another State, engaging even in activities that violate SC resolu-
tions and international law.
Consequently, it is essential to allow a review process of SC decisions that  ad-
mits some kind of accountability of its actions. The ICJ, seems to be the appropriate 
organism, to conduct a process of judicial review of such decisions;  the UN Charter 
and the Court’s own practice, as well as that of other international tribunals, seem to 
support this contention.
Even if faced with SC resolutions based on an ethical principle like RtoP, the Court 
will be able to avoid a situation of non liquet by using the complete framework of the 
sources of international law, as described within article 38 of its Statute. Furthermore, 
another way to deal with a possible situation of non liquet, would be to regard RtoP 
as soft law and consequently, use it to interpret the Charter in accordance to the new 
understanding of its provisions that appears to be reflected in RtoP.
Moreover, If the vagueness of RtoP presents itself as an issue to the Court in a 
process of judicial review of SC resolutions, then it seems possible that the ICJ could 
rely on JWT as a subsidiary tool for the Court’s process of legal reasoning. Based on 
the significant resemblances that the UN Charter and JWT paradigms seem to share 
on the matter of SC collective enforcement operations. And the possibility that the 
Court has to use ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’232. 
Nevertheless, as judicial review remains a contested issue in international law, it 
would be important to consider the possibility of a general set of guidelines, perhaps 
through a UNGA resolution or even better trough a reform of the ICJ Statute, that 
would bring clarity on how this process should be conducted. Additionally, in case 
that more authoritative weight is needed for the application of JWT criteria, it would 
__________________________
232. ICJ Statute art 38(d).
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be important to reconsider the suggestion of the High- level Panel on Threats Cha-
llenges and Change and adopt its proposal of six criteria of legitimacy ‘as declaratory 
resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly’233. 
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